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I. INTRODUCTION
Walk up to a non-lawyer and say the words "res judicata" or "collateral
estoppel" and you will receive a blank stare for your trouble. Given the
vital role that these two doctrines play within the legal system, it seems
incredible that only a select few have ever heard these words and that,
within the legal system, only an even more select few know the true
meaning of the words and how to manipulate the concepts these words
represent. This Comment, however, will not propose to explain definitively
res judicata and collateral estoppel since this has been done elsewhere.
Instead, this Comment will analyze the effects of res judicata and collateral
estoppel as they apply to arbitration within the state of Ohio. Given the
ever-increasing caseload of the courts and the growing popularity of
arbitration as an alternative means of resolving disputes, it was only a
matter of time before a variety of judicial doctrines were applied to
streamline further the arbitral process.
In order to fully understand the precise relationship between res
judicata or collateral estoppel and arbitration within Ohio, a succinct
working knowledge of these doctrines must be established. Part II of this
Comment will provide general definitions of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, not limited to Ohio. Part II will also examine some of the
underlying policies used to justify the use of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in the context of judicial litigation. Part II then sets forth the
specific Ohio definitions of these doctrines as developed through the case
law. Part IV lists many of the common problems that have emerged as Ohio
courts have struggled to apply judicial doctrines in the context of
arbitration. Part V analyzes the general commentary on the use of res
judicata and collateral estoppel in arbitral proceedings, such as the
evidentiary, procedural, contractual, and societal problems that arise when
these doctrines are employed to augment arbitration. Finally, Part VI
presents the author's conclusions on whether the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel have been correctly applied to arbitration in Ohio.
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1I. THE GENERAL NATURE OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
A. Res Judicata Defined
Scholars have proposed many different definitions of res judicata and
collateral estoppel ranging from the simple to the incredibly complex. "Res
judicata" literally means "the thing decided" 1 and is more commonly
known to lawyers as "claim preclusion" even though it is often erroneously
used to describe preclusion of both claims and issues. Simply put, the
doctrine of res judicata ("res judicata" or "claim preclusion") states that
"[o]nce a claim or cause of action has been presented for adjudication and a
valid and final judgment on the merits has been rendered, the same claim or
cause of action cannot be asserted in a subsequent suit."2 More generally,
claim preclusion has been defined as a doctrine which "prevents a defendant
from raising any new defense to defeat the enforcement of an earlier
judgment."' The best way to define claim preclusion is in terms of its
component parts: "Among the essential elements of [claim preclusion] are
(1) identity of parties; (2) identity of claim or cause of action; (3) validity
and finality of judgment, award, or order of the court or tribunal; (4) full
opportunity to be heard .... ",a Thus, in traditional judicial terms, when a
litigant has received a final, valid judgment on his cause of action against
another, that litigant cannot bring the same cause of action in another suit
against his former opponent. The original decision of the litigant's claim
precludes the litigant from bringing the same claim again.
Traditionally, claim preclusion effectively prevented a "later suit on
any claims that were required to be joined in that suit, whether they were or
[were] not."s While it appears that this view of claim preclusion requires
the plaintiff in civil litigation to join all of his claims in one lawsuit, the
"plaintiff is not seen as having several claims that must be joined, but rather
as having one claim that cannot be split."6 Therefore, when a party to a
lawsuit obtains a valid and final judgment on the merits of a claim, that
party cannot bring a later claim that is part and parcel of the original claim.
Though this definition of claim preclusion is deceptively simple and
1 BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
2 ROBERT C. CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL 18 (1976).
3 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 607 (1985).
4 WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: TOOLS FOR
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 12 (1988).
5 CASAD, supra note 2, at 61.
6id.
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does not examine the problems that arise in applying the elements of claim
preclusion, it provides a general understanding of how res judicata works in
relation to traditional litigation and will suffice as a background from which
to understand the differences in Ohio's definition of claim preclusion and its
use in arbitration.
B. Collateral Estoppel Defined
Collateral estoppel ("issue preclusion" or "collateral estoppel") states
that "[a]n issue essential to the judgment repdered, which was actually
litigated and determined by a court having jurisdiction of subject matter and
over the person of the parties, may not be relitigated by the same parties or
those in privity with them. " 7 It has been written that collateral estoppel
"precludes relitigation of any issue, regardless of whether the second action
is on the same claim as the first one, if that particular issue actually was
contested and decided in the first action."8 Again, this definition can be
broken down into several parts: "In determining the availability of [issue
preclusion] courts have taken into consideration such essential elements as
(1) identity of parties; (2) identical issues or facts; (3) validity and finality
of the judgment or award; (4) full opportunity to be heard. ... "9 Note that
the issue must be one essential to the judgment of the first suit because a
determination of an issue which is "unnecessary or immaterial to the
judgment rendered in the case, does not bear sufficient assurance of
correctness to warrant giving it issue preclusion effect." 10 While some of
these requirements are similar to those needed for res judicata, the
difference is quite clear: "Res judicata prevents relitigation of claims;
collateral estoppel ends controversy over issues."" Other differences exist:
Res judicata applies regardless of whether there has been an adversary
contest on a particular matter; collateral estoppel operates only when an
issue has been litigated fully. Res judicata precludes only subsequent suits
on the same cause of action; collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation
of issues in later suits on any cause of action.12
Again, this definition is only illustrative, not comprehensive. With this
7 CASAD, supra note 2, at 123.
8 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 607.
9 FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 22.
10 CAsAD, supra note 2, at 155.
11 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 613.
12 Id.
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general description of res judicata and collateral estoppel, it can be seen
how Ohio defines these preclusive doctrines and applies them to arbitration.
Before examining how Ohio has refined and applied res judicata and
collateral estoppel, common sense necessitates an examination of the
underlying policies served by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
C. The Public Policies Underlying Res Judicata
A variety of reasons can be advanced for the development of preclusion
within litigation, but almost every comprehensive list of policy
considerations would include the notions of judicial economy, individual
economy, and respect for the courts. "The objective of all judicial
proceedings, of course, is the rendition of a judgment - an authoritative
determination of the legal relations of the parties with respect to some
particular matter." 13 How then, do res judicata and collateral estoppel aid in
the rendition of a judgment? With regard to res judicata, "[m]odern
procedure seeks to maximize the efficiency of judicial proceedings by
encouraging the presentation of all claims that can conveniently be tried
together in the framework of a single lawsuit."14 Even more succinctly, the
"principles of claim preclusion.., are aimed at limiting the number of
lawsuits that may be brought with respect to the same basic controversy. "15
By using res judicata to preclude duplicitous litigation, the courts can use
the time that would have been spent relitigating the same claim to deliberate
on cases whose claims are being presented for the first time. Clearly,
"judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be heard by
the court is limited," so res judicata "thus conserves scarce judicial
resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of the public at large."16
The effects of res judicata are not limited to maximizing the use of
judicial resources; res judicata also maximizes the resources of parties to the
litigation.17 By limiting the number of times the same claim can be brought,
res judicata conserves resources of the parties, such as money and time. The
parties also have other interests served by the application of res judicata to
claims:
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an
interest in the stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts in
13 CAsAD, supra note 2, at 1.
14 Id. at 26.
15 Id. at 122.
16 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 615.
17 FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 11.
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order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in
resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the
same claims again and again.' 8
As for the losing party, who would like another chance to litigate the
issue and gain a judgment in his favor, the risk of judicial error "should be
corrected through appeals procedures, not through repeated suits on the
same claim. " 19 For the parties, res judicata serves not only to conserve a
variety of resources, but to channel litigation in the proper direction rather
than allowing the parties to misuse the courts again and again on the same
claim.
Res judicata also serves a third interest: the public. In certain types of
litigation, such as business and land transactions, "everyone should be able
to rely on the finality" of the judicial determination of the rights of the
parties.20 The respect that res judicata accords to the finality of court
judgments also benefits the public. After all, "to allow relitigation creates
the risk of inconsistent results."21 By providing for a certain measure of
finality, res judicata secures public respect for the idea that courts are the
proper and final arena for the resolution of disputes. As the Supreme Court
has so aptly observed, "[r]es judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial
decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other
disputes."22
D. The Public Policies Underlying Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel also furthers an interest in judicial economy: "The
underlying rationale of issue preclusion.., is the idea that the adversary
process is as likely to lead to a correct decision on an issue the first time it
is presented as it is the second time."23 After an issue has been fully
litigated between the parties, "spending additional time and money
repeating this process would be extremely wasteful. " 24 Although the
possibility exists that the conclusiveness of issues may give rise to more
litigation in the first lawsuit,25 issue preclusion generally "operates to
18 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 615.
19 Id
.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
23 CAsAD, supra note 2, at 150.
24 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 658.
25 Id. at 658 n.4.
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simplify dispute resolution by considering the original court's determination
on specific issues to be binding; any subsequent litigation between the
parties, even on different claims, will be limited to only those issues being
presented for the first time." 26
Collateral estoppel, like res judicata and its underlying policies,
benefits both the courts and the parties by conserving the resources and time
of both. Allowing parties to repeatedly contest already-litigated issues
would result in a great waste of time and money. Unlike res judicata,
however, collateral estoppel takes judicial and party economy one step
further. Assuming arguendo, that a party could bring another claim arising
out of the same essential facts of an earlier claim - but not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata - as long as an issue presented in the earlier
litigation met the requirements for the imposition of collateral estoppel,
both parties would be precluded from wasting their resources and the
resources of the court in relitigating that issue. So, even when res judicata
fails of its essential purpose, collateral estoppel can still conserve party and
judicial resources to a more limited extent.
Like res judicata, collateral estoppel creates faith in the role of the
courts by preventing "the anomalous situation, so damaging to public faith
in the judicial system, of two authoritative but conflicting answers being
given to the very same questions." 27 Should the courts be seen as unable to
resolve disputes with any degree of finality, public faith in the judicial
system would be eroded and the courts would not be seen as an effective or
even useful medium for protecting society's interests. At least in regard to
the finality of already-litigated issues, collateral estoppel reaffirms the
public faith in the judicial system by according finality and certainty - if
not necessarily accuracy - to the courts' resolution of litigated issues
between parties. Thus, at least in the traditional judicial system, res judicata
and collateral estoppel are applied on the basis of sound public policies.
II. THE OHIO CASE LAW DEFINITIONS OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA
Within Ohio, several prominent cases express the requirements needed
to gain the preclusive effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel. To
understand how the courts in Ohio have struggled to apply res judicata and
collateral estoppel to arbitration, the current Ohio judicial treatment of these
doctrines must be examined.
26 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 658 n.4 (footnotes omitted).
27 CAsAD, supra note 2, at 123.
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A. Hicks v. De La Cruz2 a
In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the appeal of Isaac
Hicks, Jr., who, through his mother, Alice Hicks, sued Aurora De La Cruz,
a doctor, and the Good Samaritan Hospital, located in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The suit also named as defendants the University of Cincinnati, the City of
Cincinnati, and the Board of Trustees of the University of Cincinnati, all of
them doing business as Cincinnati General Hospital. The defendants
("Cincinnati, et al.") received a summary judgment motion in their favor
after they asserted immunity from negligence occurring at the hospital by
virtue of their state/governmental status in both the ownership and the
operation of the hospital. 29
On appeal, the Hicks relied heavily upon the case of Sears v.
Cincinnati,3" which involved an action to recover personal injury damages
from the City of Cincinnati as the operator of the Cincinnati General
Hospital. As the Ohio Supreme Court opinion succinctly states in the Hicks
case:
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ascertained but one real issue: Did the
trial court err in thus granting summary judgment under the evidence
submitted to it by the movants in support of the motion? The Court of
Appeals observed that the factual assertions made by appellees as to the
state affiliation of the University of Cincinnati were practically
uncontroverted by appellants, whose reliance before both the trial court
and appellate court was premised, as here upon Sears.31
In the Hicks case, then, the Ohio Supreme Court dealt with a summary
judgment motion concerning the ownership and control of the Cincinnati
General Hospital. "In short, this court is now being asked to relitigate the
issue of ownership and control of the hospital in the face of Cincinnati's
repeated assertions in Sears that it owned, operated and controlled the
hospital."32
This case clearly concerns the use of issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized and defined the doctrine of
collateral estoppel as follows:
28 369 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1977).
29 Id. at 776-77.
30 285 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio 1972).
31 Hicks v. De La Cruz, 369 N.E.2d 776, 777 (Ohio 1977).
3 2 id.
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(The modem view of res judicata embraces the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, which basically states that if an issue of fact or law actually is
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, such determination
being essential to that judgment, the determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim. A party precluded under this principle from relitigating an issue
with an opposing party likewise is precluded from doing so with another
person unless he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the
first action, or unless other circumstances justify according him an
opportunity to relitigate that issue.
33
The Ohio Supreme Court makes it clear that Ohio "adheres to the strict
doctrine of mutuality, whereby a party claiming the benefit of collateral
estoppel must be one who would have been bound to his detriment had the
earlier judgment gone the other way. "34 In Ohio, collateral estoppel cannot
be applied against one who is essentially a stranger to the original litigation
(i.e., not one of the named parties or their privies). In the instant case, the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the
summary judgment motion by finding that Cincinnati, et al. should not be
allowed to "relitigate the issue of ownership and control of this hospital"
since they were represented parties (or were in actual privity with the
represented parties in Sears) and had been "accorded a full and fair day in
court in that proceeding. 35
B. Norwood v. McDonald 36
In this 1943 case, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the doctrine of res
judicata. The court had to determine whether James N. Norwood was barred
from his current claim - for possession of Ada L. McDannold's (deceased
as of 1943) real estate - against the administrator (McDonald, hereinafter
"administrator") of Ada L. McDannold's estate by Norwood's earlier action
for the same real estate. The original action was brought by Norwood
claiming that he was entitled to the property through a trust because he had
furnished the purchase money that enabled the acquisition of the property.
The subsequent, current action alleged that Norwood was entitled to the real
property because of his status as the common-law husband of Ada L.
McDannold and because he is her sole heir at law. The administrator claims
33 Hicks, 369 N.E.2d at 777.
34 Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
35 id.
36 52 N.E.2d 67 (Ohio 1943).
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that Norwood is barred from maintaining the current suit because of the
doctrine of res judicata. 37
The Ohio Supreme Court defined res judicata to mean that "an existing
final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions and facts
in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. ".g The court went
on to note that a "judgment in a former action does not bar a subsequent
action where the cause of action prosecuted is not the same, even though
each action relates to the same subject matter." 39 To determine if
Norwood's current suit was barred by res judicata, the court had to examine
the so-called "identity of the facts" test. This test essentially states that if
the same facts or evidence would be used to maintain both actions, "the two
actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the
former is a bar to the subsequent action."40 The court then noted the effect
of collateral estoppel to preclude issues, but not claims. It is precisely this
distinction between issue preclusion and claim preclusion that the court fails
to maintain that obscures the result of the case.
The administrator argued that the issue of title to the property had been
litigated in his favor (because the administrator also claimed sole heir status)
and precluded any later litigation upon the same issue. The court found that
the issue of the administrator's status as sole heir had not been necessary to
the determination of the first action because the claim of the first action
involved trust issues, not title through inheritance issues. The court then
applied the identity of facts test and found that the beneficial trust claim
"accrued during the lifetime of Ada L. McDannold and clearly could not be
extinguished by her death," whereas the claim of inheritance of the property
"arose upon, but not before, the death of Ada L. McDannold." 41 The court
concluded that the distinct nature of these rights meant that they could not
exist at the same time and therefore could not be a single cause of action.
The court found this to be true "even though there [were] some evidential
facts which support both claims." 42
In response to this argument, the administrator claimed that the
previous suit was preclusive not only of all claims actually asserted therein,
but also of all claims which could have been asserted (hereinafter "'potential
37 Norwood, 52 N.E.2d 67, 68-69.
38 d. at 71.
3 9 1d.
40 Id.
4 1 Id. at 73.
4 2 Norwood, 52 N.E.2d at 73.
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claim' preclusion"). Addressing this "potential claim" preclusion argument,
the supreme court applied instead a "potential issue" preclusion argument:
"The rule that a judgment is conclusive, not only as to what was determined
in an action but as to all issues of fact which properly might have been
determined therein, is limited to cases involving a single cause of action."43
The court found that the issue of heir-at-law status had not been fully
litigated in the previous action and was only asserted for the first time in the
subsequent action and thus could not have been necessary to the judgment in
the first action, a necessary requirement for issue preclusion to apply. The
problem, however, is that the court does not squarely address the question
of whether claim preclusion operates to bar all potential claims that might
have been brought in the original suit.
The majority opinion resolves this problem by relying on a then-
existing statute which provided that the "joinder of several causes of action
in one action is permissible but not mandatory." 44 The majority believed
that "potential claim" preclusion only applied to a single cause of action and
that here there were two separate causes of action. Why, however, should
such "potential claim" preclusion be limited to cases involving a single
cause of action? Would not "potential claim" preclusion apply more directly
to the situation where there are two causes of action that achieve the same
recovery? The dissent recognizes this problem in noting that the "recovery
sought in both cases was the fee simple title to the same real estate."45 The
dissent did not understand why claim preclusion should not apply where
there are two entirely different causes of action which can be brought to
achieve the same recovery, yet only one of those causes of action is actually
asserted.
In conclusion, this case causes considerable confusion by failing to
distinguish properly, at all times, the distinction between claim and issue
preclusion. Nonetheless, the case establishes a definition of the elements
needed for claim preclusion to apply.
C. Whitehead v. General Telephone Co.46
In 1969, the Ohio Supreme Court followed and elaborated somewhat
upon the Norwood case. In Whitehead v. General Telephone Co., the court
had occasion to determine whether a failed action by the parents of an
injured minor child against the defendant for medical expenses and loss of
43 Norvood, 52 N.E.2d at 73.
44id.
45 Id. at 78 (Turner, J., dissenting).
46 254 N.E.2d 10 (Ohio 1969).
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services collaterally estops the injured child from bringing suit against the
same defendant to recover personal injury damages. The determinative
issues in the case were (1) whether the child in the second suit was
considered a party or a real party in interest in the first suit; (2) whether the
child was in privity with a named party in the first suit; or (3) whether the
child exerted control over the litigation in the first suit.47
The Ohio Supreme Court cited and discussed the holding of the
Norwood case pertaining to res judicata and to collateral estoppel. Of
collateral estoppel, the court said that "even where the cause of action is
different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless
affect the outcome of the second suit." 48 The court found that the current
case involved a situation where the injury to the child created two "separate
and distinct" causes of action: the derivative action by the parents of the
child and the personal injury action by the child.49 The court then discussed
the problem of mutuality as it applies in collateral estoppel.
The court stated the traditional view of mutuality:
Traditionally it has been held that collateral estoppel applies only to
situations in which the party seeking to use a prior judgment and the party
against whom it is being asserted were both parties in the original action,
or were in privity to such parties. Such holdings are based on the
requirement that there be mutuality of estoppel.50
Even though the appellant (the telephone company) conceded that Ohio
only recognizes collateral estoppel when the mutuality requirement is met,
appellant argued that collateral estoppel should apply by defining privity
"so as to focus on the relationship of the parties to the subject matter of the
litigation, thereby lessening the importance of identity of parties."51 This
definition of "privity" would allow collateral estoppel to apply to
subsequent suits even though one of the parties in the subsequent suit was
not a party or in privity with a party to the earlier suit. The court stated that
the adoption of this position meant that:
Mhe matter of such adequate representation would essentially be a
question of whether there was sufficient incentive and opportunity for [the
original party upon whom the subsequent non-party wants to rely upon] to
47 WTtehead, 254 N.E.2d at 11-12.
4 8 Id. at 12.
49 Id.
5 0 Id. at 13.
51 M at 14.
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adequately litigate the issue in the prior suit in such a manner that [the
opposing party in the original suit's] interests were fully and fairly
represented.
52
The court noted Ohio's consistent position regarding the identity of
parties requirement for collateral estoppel and proceeded to examine Ohio
definitions of "party" and "privity." In Ohio, "parties" are those who (1)
have the right to make a defense in a suit; (2) control the litigation; and (3)
have a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation.53 For a person to
be in privity with another in Ohio generally means he "succeeds to an estate
or an interest formerly held by another."54 Despite these definitions, the
court noted that there had been a tendency to consider a party connected by
interest to litigation and actively involved in that litigation to be bound by
the judgment therein.
In this case, the court found no privity between the parents and the
child because the derivative suit of the parents, while arising out of the
same wrong that gave rise to the child's suit, does not come about by
succession to the child's interest. The court also found that the child could
not be considered a real party in interest within the parents' suit and that the
child had no control over the litigation in the original suit. Thus, the court
continued to adhere to the traditional requirement of identity of parties (i.e.,
"mutuality") to apply properly collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit. In so
finding, the court stated the underlying basis for its opinion:
In our opinion, the existing Ohio requirement that there be an identity of
parties or their privies is founded upon the sound principle that all persons
are entitled to their day in court. The doctrine of res judicata is a
necessary judicial development involving consideration of finality and
multiplicity, but it should not be permitted to encroach upon fundamental
and imperative rights. It is our opinion that the rule advocated by the
appellant could create grave problems in establishing the adequacy of a
nonparty's representation in the prior suit and that the case at bar is not
one which should result in a departure from present Ohio law.
55
D. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. 56
Perhaps to clarify any possible misconceptions about the principle of
52 Whitehead, 254 N.E.2d at 14.
53 Whitehead, 254 N.E.2d at 14.
54 Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
55 id.
56 443 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1983).
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mutuality in Ohio collateral estoppel case law, the Ohio Supreme Court, in
1983, wrote in the syllabus of a now oft-quoted opinion:
In Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a requisite to
collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. As a general principle, collateral
estoppel operates only where all of the parties to the present proceeding
were bound by the prior judgment. A judgment, in order to preclude
either party from relitigating an issue, must be preclusive upon both. A
prior judgment estops a party, or a person in privity with him, from
subsequently relitigating the identical issue raised in the prior action.5 7
The actual facts of this case need not be stated since almost the entire
opinion exclusively examines Ohio case law on collateral estoppel and the
issue of whether the mutuality principle should be abandoned.
The pertinent part of the opinion begins by recognizing the definitions
of res judicata and collateral estoppel already discussed above. After stating
the mutuality principle, the court notes that in "recent years there has been
much discussion in case law and law journals as to the legal viability of the
application of the strict doctrine of mutuality as a requisite to collateral
estoppel."5 8 The court then recognizes that much of the argument
surrounding the requirement of mutuality stems from a specific use of
collateral estoppel: offensive collateral estoppel. Offensive collateral
estoppel, in a non mutuality setting, essentially means that in a subsequent
suit the plaintiff, who was not a party to the prior suit, may assert collateral
estoppel against the defendant, who was a party to the prior suit, to
preclude the defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior suit. The United States
Supreme Court allows such use of offensive collateral estoppel provided that
the party asserting the collateral estoppel meets the burden of establishing
that the same issue was litigated in the prior action and must also establish
that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.59
The Ohio Supreme Court cites to the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, which provides specific rules in applying offensive collateral
estoppel, and to the rules in various other courts to show how such a use of
collateral estoppel requires "time-consuming and costly investigations...
into collateral issues that may be essentially irrelevant to the actual issues
between the parties then present before the court." 60 Such investigation and
57 Goodson, 443 N.E.2d at 979.
58 Id. at 982.
59 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
60 Good.son, 443 N.E.2d at 983.
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examination of the record in the prior suit "would often offset any savings
derived from collateral estoppel, and may indeed increase the total amount
of litigation" thereby depriving the doctrine of collateral estoppel of its
primary purpose: "the economy of the judicial process. "61
The court did find at least one exception to the requirement of
mutuality based upon a reading of the Hicks case. The Hicks opinion did
cite to the aforementioned Restatement (Second) of Judgments, but in the
instant case, the Ohio Supreme Court read Hicks to state that when it can be
shown "that the party defendant clearly had his day in court on the specific
issue brought into litigation within the later proceeding, the non-party
plaintiff [can] rely upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude the
relitigation of that specific issue. "62 The court then proceeded to emphasize
how Ohio case law has overwhelmingly adhered to a requirement of
mutuality in collateral estoppel. The court also found that:
[C]ollaterally estopping a party from relitigating an issue previously
decided against it violates due process where it could not be foreseen that
the issue would subsequently be utilized collaterally, and where the party
had little knowledge or incentive to litigate fully and vigorously in the first
action due to the procedural and/or factual circumstances presented
therein. 63
The court concluded its discussion of the mutuality issue by finding that
mutuality as a requisite to the application of collateral estoppel effectively
balances judicial economy with notions of due process and the right to be
heard.
IV. THE MOST COMMON ARBITRAL RES JUDICATA AND
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PROBLEMS IN OHIO CASE LAW
Having examined how the Supreme Court of Ohio has defined res
judicata and collateral estoppel in terms of traditional judicial litigation, we
can now focus on how Ohio courts have struggled to apply these judicial
doctrines to arbitration proceedings. The real question is whether the results
of arbitration proceedings should have the same res judicata and collateral
estoppel effects that are given to final judgments in court proceedings.
Thus, can one party to an arbitration proceeding collaterally estop another
party by claiming that the issue was decided in a previous arbitration
61 Goodson, 443 N.E.2d at 983-84.
62 Id. at 985.
63 Id. at 986.
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proceeding? Will the findings of arbitration have res judicata or collateral
estoppel consequences in subsequent judicial litigation? By looking at some
of the most common problems that have occurred in Ohio case law on these
issues over the years, these and other questions can be answered. It should
be noted that the cases discussed below are not meant to be cited as
controlling on any given issue; they are merely illustrative of how Ohio
courts have approached preclusive doctrines in the context of arbitration.
A. The Need for Final Judgment
In the case of Mote v. Garrison,64 an Ohio Court of Appeals examined
the issue of arbitration involving multiple parties and multiple claims. After
a complaint was filed, one of the defendants moved to dismiss the claims
against it on the basis of an arbitration clause. The trial court dismissed the
claims against that party but did not state whether this dismissal was with or
without prejudice. After an arbitration awarded damages for breach of
contract, the victorious party sought to have the arbitration award confirmed
in court. The dismissed party tried to assert res judicata and collateral
estoppel, but the trial court "corrected" the entry of dismissal to state that
the dismissal was without prejudice. The dismissed party claimed
prejudicial error resulting from the "correction." 65 In response, the court of
appeals stated that the judgment entry of dismissal "was not a final
appealable order" and could be revised since it was not a judgment on the
merits of the case. 66 Thus, the party asserting preclusion did so incorrectly
because in the absence of a final appealable order on the merits of the case,
neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel can be invoked.
Another case, Jackson v. Republic-Franklin Insurance Co.,67 involved
an insured party who received damages of $53,000 from a tortfeasor as the
result of a trial. Then the insured party requested the insurance company to
arbitrate the issue of the tortfeasor's liability in accordance with the policy
provisions in an attempt to determine if arbitration would set the amount of
liability closer to the limit of the policy: $100,000. The insurance company
denied any duty to arbitrate and claimed that the insured party was bound
by the previous jury award regarding the amount of damages. 68 The Ohio
Court of Appeals in this case held that since the insured party "has already
64 No. 10-90-13, 1991 WL 256515 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1991).
65 Id. at *1.
66Id. at *2.
67 584 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio CL App. 1990).
68 Id. at 52-53.
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had a final judgment entered in her favor against the negligent party" 69 and
that because the insurance company had knowledge of the lawsuit, both
were "bound by the judgment of the jury" and the doctrine of res judicata
could apply. 70 Interestingly enough, this case may fall within the exception
to traditional collateral estoppel noted by the Goodson court. Technically,
the insurance company was not a party to the judicial determination but
since it clearly had knowledge of the lawsuit and could have taken steps to
protect its rights at that time, the insurance company could be bound by the
judgment. Nor does this conflict with the Ohio Supreme Court's recognition
of the limited exception because the insured party clearly had the
opportunity and incentive to establish liability damages in the first action. In
this case, then, the final judgment of the judicial action precluded the
initiation of arbitration proceedings based upon the same issue.
The case of Beghtel v. Harris71 raises the question of whether the
findings of arbitration can be binding upon subsequent litigation or even
subsequent arbitration. After the arbitration that determined that the
Harrises had a view easement in favor of their property that required the
Beghtels (who owned the lower lot on the hill) to top their trees, the trees
continued to grow and the Harrises were forced to institute various actions
to enforce the topping of the trees. 72 The Hamilton County Court of
Appeals found that the arbitration order was binding for more than just one
"topping" and that requiring "a subsequent arbitration of the same disputed
matters every two to four years ... would be unreasonable, expensive, and
time-consuming." T3 The court then held that "the original decision of the
arbitrators is res judicata." 74
As these cases illustrate, arbitration can be precluded by a final
judgment in litigation and vice versa. Also, a finally decided issue in
arbitration can preclude subsequent arbitration. The common thread running
throughout these cases is the need for finality in both arbitration awards and
judgments. Without such finality, preclusion doctrines will not apply. Ohio
courts commonly and constantly explain to litigants asserting res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel that without a final judgment or order, such an
assertion must fail.
69 Jackson, 584 N.E.2d at 54.
7 0 Id. at 55.
71 Nos. C-800232, C-800795, C-810188, C-800715, 1981 WL 10010 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 1981).
72 Id. at *1.
73 Id. at *2.
74id
.
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B. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
One of the most common problems before Ohio courts arises in cases
involving actions by insured motorists recovering judgments against
uninsured motorists and then attempting to arbitrate the issue of liability to
receive additional compensation within the limits of the policy. The
controversy surrounding this issue arose primarily because of the case of
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Handlovic.75 In this case, the Ohio
Supreme Court stated in its syllabus that:
[l]f an insured, in good faith, prosecutes a lawsuit against an underinsured
motorist with the knowledge of the insured's insurance company,
generally both the insured and his insurance company are bound by any
final judgment rendered as a result of such lawsuit that determines the
liability of the underinsured motorist to the insured.76
The court found this to be true "regardless of whether the insurer has
consented to the prosecution of the lawsuit. "77 How then, did the supreme
court ignore its own requirement of mutuality before the preclusion
doctrines can apply? Essentially, the court reasoned that, because the
insurance company knew of the earlier proceeding, and because the insured
party had already received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of
liability and damages, the insured party is estopped from seeking arbitration
to relitigate that issue against the insurance company despite the insurance
company's non-party status in the first proceeding. 78 Given the preclusive
effect of its previous judgment, the supreme court further reasoned that even
if arbitration between the insured and his insurer were compelled, the end
result would be in vain. For example, if the arbitration proceeding awarded
damages higher than the amount awarded in the earlier litigation, the court
found that the insurer could invoke the shield of res judicata and would
have the right to reinstate the original jury verdict. Thus, even after
arbitration, the parties would be in exactly the same position. For this
reason, the court allowed the insurance company the option to refuse
arbitration of the issue.79
In Wise v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co.,80 the Franklin County Court
75 492 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio 1986).
7 6 Hanlovic, 492 N.E.2d at 417 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
7 7 Id. at 419.
78 id.
7 9 Id. at 420.
10 No. 87AP-244, 1987 WL 19561 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1987).
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of Appeals attempted to reconcile the Handlovic decision with the
requirement of mutuality. Here, the uninsured motorists sued by the insured
party failed to answer the complaint, and a default judgment was entered.
The default judgment was followed by a hearing concerning damages, a
hearing about which the insured party's insurance company had no
knowledge. The court of appeals, after discussing the requirement of
mutuality, noted that this problem arises precisely because "an insurer with
a subrogated interest is not joined in a suit as required by [the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure]." 81 Even if joinder of the insurance company was not
mandated, the court of appeals still found Handlovic distinguishable because
the original liability determination in that case did not trigger operation of
the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance company's contract
with its insured, since the other driver's insurance company paid all of the
damages awarded by the jury. 82
In the Wise case, however, the judgment in the original suit would
affect the insurance company's contract, since payment would be made
under the uninsured motorist provision of the contract. Given that the other
side did not pay any damages, as in Handlovic, the insurance company
would be obligated to pay if estopped from arbitrating the issues of liability
and damages by the judgment in the original suit. 83 The court then
discussed the Goodson exception based upon the Hicks case and noted that
the exception should only apply where the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
previous action. In the instant case, the use of a default judgment and a
hearing on damages of which the insurance company was totally unaware
meant that the insurance company "had no opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate the issue[s] of liability and damages."84
In Wise, the court found two reasons why an insurance company should
not be precluded from arbitrating the issues of liability and damages decided
in an earlier court proceeding. The first was a finding that the use of the
word "generally" in Handlovic prevented Handlovic from establishing an
absolute rule in this factual situation.85 Even more compelling than that
finding was the argument that the fact situation clearly established the lack
of a full and fair opportunity by the insurance company to litigate the issue
in the earlier action.86
81 Wise, No. 87AP-244, 1987 WL 19561 *3
82 Id. at *4.
83 Id. at *5.
8 4 id.
85 Id. at *4.
86 Wise, No. 87AP-244, 1987 WL 19561 at *5.
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As long as the Supreme Court of Ohio continues to require mutuality
while recognizing a limited exception to that requirement, this problem will
present itself again. This author believes that the Franklin County Court of
Appeals correctly established that the Handlovic finding is not a rule to be
applied regardless of whether a full and fair opportunity existed to litigate
the issue. Goodson made it clear that while there may be an exception to
mutuality in limited circumstances, such circumstances must indicate that
the underlying policies of res judicata and collateral estoppel - fairness and
opportunity to litigate - are clearly served.
C. The Effect of Preclusion on Issues Not Raised
Probably the most prevalent problem in the case law on collateral
estoppel and res judicata is whether, in the context of arbitration, there can
be preclusion of issues that might have been raised in the arbitration but
were not. Essentially, this is more of a res judicata issue than a collateral
estoppel issue, since issues actually litigated can clearly be precluded even
on the basis of arbitral findings. Though there are numerous cases dealing
with this issue, this author has included only two to illustrate how Ohio
courts have commonly dealt with this problem.
The Belmont County Court of Appeals, in Kuchinka Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Evick Construction, Inc.,87 directly questioned whether res judicata applies
when there are "multiple causes of action and a judgment is only rendered
on some of the issues." 88 In this case, the parties had already arbitrated one
issue, and one of the parties sought a second arbitration to examine another
issue. The court noted that:
[I]t would have been obviously more expeditious if all matters were
arbitrated at the same time. The question now before us is whether or not
there is a statutory prohibition or a legal prohibition preventing the
appellant from bringing again an arbitration demand. Unless we, by
judicial fiat at this time, carve out such a rule, there is none presently
existing in law either by statute or by following the law as it applies to
judgments by judicial tribunals. The doctrine... [of] res judicata deals
specifically with the matters brought before the arbitrators and not
additionally what could have been brought to them.89
The court found some authority for the proposition that res judicata in
87 No. 80-B-37, 1981 WL 4754 (Ohio CL App. Aug. 11, 1981).
88 Id. at *1.
89 Id. at *2.
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arbitration should be limited to matters actually "litigated," but relied
heavily on public policy notions of fairness to the parties:
It may well be (to avoid prolonged litigation as in this case) that the
legislature may want to address this question, but until such time, we
conclude that the answer to the issue herein is to let the parties arbitrate
on the merits rather than on balance to strike a blow for mandatory and
compulsory arbitrations of all the issues at any given time in arbitration,
especially as herein where the appellant, a lay person, could not have
known of the doctrine of res judiata .... 90
Based on the policy of fairness to the litigants and the questionable status of
the law in this area, this court chose to deny preclusion and allow the
litigants to arbitrate again issues that could have been - but were not -
raised in the first arbitration.
The same issue arose in the case of Cleveland v. Association of
Cleveland Fire Fighters,91 except that here the arbitrators in the first
arbitration expressly declined to decide certain issues, and a later court
claimed that those issues could not be litigated again due to res judicata.
The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals asserted that, for preclusive
purposes, arbitration is similar to a court judgment as to matters actually
decided. 92 This court, however, chose to rely on the contractual basis for
arbitration rather than on notions of fairness: "Since arbitrators derive their
authority from limited contractual terms and their decisions are not
appealable, they should not have the broader claim-preclusion effect
attributed to court cases." 93
Although Ohio courts have almost unanimously reached the conclusion
that the doctrine of res judicata should not preclude the litigation of issues
which could have been raised but that were not decided in an earlier
arbitration, the courts reach this conclusion by different reasoning.
Interestingly enough, the courts have essentially emasculated the doctrine of
res judicata in terms of arbitration by limiting preclusion in arbitration to a
collateral estoppel effect. Until the legislature or the Ohio Supreme Court
addresses the use of res judicata in arbitral proceedings, it still remains
possible that a court might find a valid reason for applying the broad
doctrine of res judicata to preclude further arbitration of matters that could
- or should - have been brought in the earlier arbitration.
90 Evick, No. 80-B-37, 1981 WL 4754 at *3.
91 485 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
92 Id. at 798.
93 Id.
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V. THE ARGUMENT FOR RESTRAINT IN ARBrrRAL PRECLUSION:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNDERLYING POLICIES OF
PRECLUSION AND THE FORUM DIFFERENCES
Oddly enough, none of the Ohio cases examining the use of preclusion
in arbitration purport to analyze whether preclusion should even be applied
to arbitration. In Ohio case law, the courts appear to have presumed that res
judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitral proceedings as well as
judicial proceedings. However, there are several reasons why Ohio courts
should exercise more restraint in applying preclusive doctrines to
arbitration. The following discussion will emphasize how the underlying
policies of preclusion and the differences between arbitral and judicial
proceedings favors a more discriminating approach toward arbitral
preclusion than currently taken by Ohio courts.
A. The Substantive Procedural Differences Between the Forums
Clearly, there are differences between arbitration and litigation.
Arbitration is a means of alternative dispute resolution, a function
supplemental to traditional litigation. "While some arbitrations are
elaborate, more typically they are less formal than court litigation. "94 There
are many differences between arbitration and litigation:
As a practical matter, discovery is often limited or unavailable.
Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence and indeed may draw
on their personal knowledge in making awards. Witnesses need not be
required to testify under oath. If a written record of a proceeding exists, it
need not be as complete as in litigation. Arbitrators are not required to
write decisions that disclose the facts or reasons behind their awards, and
in fact are often discouraged from doing so.95
Furthermore, "arbitrators are legally free to render compromise awards
rather than traditional 'all or nothing' decisions," and research has
suggested that arbitrators do tend more toward compromise between the
parties.96 Such compromise awards are not findings "with respect to any
94 Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel Using Preclusion to Shape
Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. Rnv. 29, 36 (1988).
95 id.
96 G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial
Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 633 (1988).
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factual issue," but are "merely a solution to a conflict." 97
As illustrated above, one of the most commonly cited differences
between arbitration and litigation concerns the powers of the arbitrator.
Unlike arbitration, judicial proceedings operate in a system subject to
appellate review, and parties develop the crucial issues and introduce the
evidence to an independent fact finder for resolution of the legal and
evidentiary conflicts. 98 In arbitration, the final judgment is rendered by the
arbitrator, "who need not be a judge or lawyer nor need he possess any
legal skills at all. 99 Also, an arbitrator "is more likely to assess the entire
relationship between the parties, rather than to confine the inquiry to the
particular claim asserted." 100 Though the arbitration may be limited by the
terms of the contractual agreement between the parties, in the absence of
such guidelines, arbitrators are generally free to exercise broad discretion in
resolving the dispute.' 01
Another procedural difference that presents a major problem is the lack
of a written record, or if such a record should exist, the vagueness of the
record. "[A]rbitration awards are frequently unexplained and difficult to
interpret."102 At present, many arbitrators merely announce an award
without furnishing any written opinion to substantiate the findings of the
award.10 3 "Indeed, arbitration organizations discourage written opinions for
fear that such explanations make awards more vulnerable to attack by the
losing party. " 104 The end result is confusion in the courts about whether
preclusion should apply:
In some cases, courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel to preclude
litigation when there is insufficient information in the award to clearly
determine which issues were litigated in the arbitration. Thus, where an
arbitration award gives no indication of the basis for the award, a court
cannot determine which issues were actually litigated and which were
97 Shell, supra note 96, at 659.
98 Rex R. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of
Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422, 452 (1983).
99 Melissa Hope Biren, Note, Res Judcata/Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Court
Determination in Subsequent Arbitration, 45 ALB. L. REv. 1029, 1042 (1981).
100 Motomura, supra note 94, at 38.
101 Biren, supra note 99, at 1042-43.
102 Shell, supra note 96, at 659.
103 Ranlet Shelden Willingham, Comment, Securities Arbitration: Issues After
McMahon, 24 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 409, 427 (1989).
104 Shell, supra note 96, at 659-60.
[Vol. 10:1 1994]
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN ARBITRATION
critical and necessary to the award.105
At least in the case of arbitration followed by litigation, then, the
procedures followed by arbitrators often make it difficult for courts to
impose preclusion.
Nowhere is the broad discretion and informality of arbitration more
evident than in the type of evidence that can be introduced in an arbitration
proceeding. Arbitrators are not bound by substantive law nor by rules of
evidence, 10 6 and, consequently, "arbitrators may conduct the hearing with a
commonsense notion of what is important in resolving the case and thus
may accept all evidence offered by the parties." 10 7 It has been noted that
"an arbitrator who adopts a liberal admission standard is less likely to have
his award overturned by a reviewing court than is one who adopts a
restrictive standard." 0 8 Nevertheless, some schools of thought do
encourage arbitrators to follow the rules of evidence and it should be noted
that the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes requires arbitrators to "provide a fair and adequate
hearing which assures that both parties have sufficient opportunity to
present their respective evidence." 10 9 The fact still remains, however, that
arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence and are free to consider
evidence that might not meet judicial standards, such as rules concerning
relevance and hearsay.
B. The Different Goals of Arbitration
These above-mentioned differences are just a few of the procedural
differences that almost uniformly exist between arbitration and litigation
throughout the United States. These differences do serve a purpose.
Arbitration is meant to proceed more quickly than traditional litigation and
to provide a less adversarial resolution to disputes. Arbitration proceedings
"are not structured with the same goals in mind as those of formal court-like
proceedings, especially with regard to issue determinations. " 110 Using
arbitration, parties can essentially create their own "'system of private law'
to meet their individual needs and desires by voluntarily choosing
105 Wdilingham, supra note 103, at 430.
106 Biren, supra note 99, at 1043.
1 07 MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 3 (2d
ed. 1987).
108 Id. at 4.
109 Id.
110 Perschbacher, supra note 98, at 452.
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procedures unique to the arbitral process rather than resorting to the
courts." ' The following excerpt discusses the different goals sought by
arbitration and litigation and the means used for achieving those goals:
To the extent that notions of efficiency and reduction of caseloads
inevitably conflict with concepts of fairness and substantial justice for the
individual litigant, the nature of this conflict differs between judicial
forums and administrative or arbitral forums. Justice and fairness in
judicial forums are viewed in terms of formal rituals supervised by an
impartial and independent judiciary. These rituals are governed by rules
of evidence and procedure and by case law. Justice and fairness in
administrative and arbitral forums, however, have traditionally been
viewed in terms of permitting citizens access to a simplified, expedited
and informal dispute resolution system. Indeed, elaborate pre-trial
discovery and lengthy evidentiary hearings with technical rules of
evidence are often inimical to achieving administrative and arbitral
justice.112
Given the more informal processes employed by arbitration and the
different goals therein, the courts should, at the least, tread cautiously
before applying traditional judicial doctrines to arbitration. After all,
"[u]nder the present state of the law, the determinations of arbitrators have
implications far beyond the case before the arbitrator," since "decisions of
arbitrators have far-reaching res judicata and collateral estoppel effects." 1 3
The goals of quick, effective resolution of disputes in an informal, less
adversarial manner, while laudable, may not always coincide with the
underlying goals of claim and issue preclusion. To restate this, the goal of
efficient solutions to conflicts may not mesh with the goal of a full and fair
opportunity to litigate a claim or issue.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OHIO COURTS
In the rush to embrace the benefits of alternative dispute resolution, the
Ohio courts should not sacrifice fundamental fairness upon the altar of
economy and quickness of resolution. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
should not be used to preclude parties from an opportunity to litigate or
111 Biren, supra note 99, at 1039.
112 Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law?, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 63, 87 (1986).
113 Arthur D. Spatt, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, ARB. J., June 1987, at 61,
63.
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arbitrate an issue unless the circumstances clearly indicate that the parties
received a full and fair opportunity to litigate or arbitrate the issue at a
previous proceeding. For Ohio courts to remain in the forefront of
developing alternatives to traditional litigation, they should consider several
factors before indiscriminately applying the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
First, the courts and arbitrators should look beyond the mere terms of
the contract to ascertain the parties' intent. While it can easily be established
that a party consented to arbitration, it is not so clear that the same party
truly understood the potentially far-reaching effects of such an arbitration.
If an arbitrator or judge can clearly establish that a party to an arbitration
agreement lacked any knowledge of the potential preclusive effects of the
arbitration, then the judge or arbitrator should consider that fact in
determining whether preclusion applies. Perhaps the courts could encourage
the use of a standard clause in arbitration agreements that require specific
notice to each party of the potential preclusive effects of any arbitration
proceeding. While not determinative, the intent and/or knowledge of the
parties may make the use of res judicata or collateral estoppel fundamentally
unfair.
In so doing, Ohio courts would adhere to their stated policies upon
which res judicata and collateral estoppel are based. Notions of judicial and
party economy should not overcome notions of fairness to the parties. In
cases like Goodson and Norwood, the Supreme Court of Ohio clearly stated
that Ohio favors the use of res judicata and collateral estoppel as long as it
comports with traditional notions of due process and fairness to the parties.
"While res judicata and collateral estoppel play a vital role in protecting the
integrity of the judicial system, they should not be applied when to do so
would undermine their own usefulness and the utility and essential
characteristics of arbitration."114 The courts, then, should not look just to
see if the standard requirements of res judicata and collateral estoppel have
been complied with, but also whether applying preclusion produces a result
in line with Ohio's particular view of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The courts should examine more carefully the procedural differences
between the forums of litigation and arbitration. After all, "[s]atisfaction of
the full and fair opportunity test requires a comparison of the procedural
opportunities available to the litigants in the initial and subsequent
forums." 115 If, in a certain case, it is easily determinable that the arbitration
proceeding lacked some of the basic safeguards of fairness, then preclusion
should be denied.
114 Biren, supra note 99, at 1059.
115 Carlisle, supra note 112, at 68.
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The problem with this request is that it results in arbitration that looks
suspiciously 'like litigation. This is so because the only way a later court
examining an earlier arbitration can determine if fundamental fairness was
achieved is by looking at the record. As noted above, there is a substantial
dearth of informative records in arbitration proceedings. One could require
that more formal, written records be kept of the arbitration, but this only
results in a weakening of some of the basic attributes of arbitration. Keeping
more complete records would sacrifice arbitral economy. The arbitration
would then "become more formalized and rigid as lawyers import their
usual procedures into the process." 116 This is a difficult problem because of
the many methods of alternative dispute resolution that exist and the
different procedures followed in each. Yet, it would be anomalous to
request courts to examine the case for procedural deficiencies without a
means for doing so.
Until a better solution is offered, Ohio courts should require either (1) a
standard notice, at the beginning of arbitration, to the parties that they may
wish to request, at their own expense, a copy of the proceedings due to the
possibility of preclusion, or (2) a written record of the proceedings that
provides enough information to establish a rebuttable presumption that the
proceeding accorded the parties fundamental fairness. Since the Ohio courts
already require that the party asserting error in the arbitration provide a
transcript of the arbitration, at the party's expense, 117 this rule would not
substantially burden the parties any further. The warning requirement has
the advantage of ensuring that the party asserting error in the arbitration
could not claim prejudice due to the lack of a transcript. Without the
warning, the second requirement provides that, in contested cases where
neither party requested a transcript, the reviewing court has a modicum of
information beyond the award from which to establish whether a party
failed to receive due process through the use of improper preclusion.
116 REMOVING THE BARRIERS TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 1I - 67 (Vermont Law School Dispute Resolution Project ed., 1994).
117 Cleveland Constr. Interiors, Inc. v. Ruhlin Co., No. 90-L-14-060, 1991 WL 54150,
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1991).
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Finally, Ohio courts should more carefully examine the use of res
judicata and collateral estoppel in arbitral proceedings. Merely because the
arbitration allegedly followed certain recognized procedures does not
establish that the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate their
claims or issues. Asking Ohio courts to scrutinize closely the proceeding for
fairness and procedural deficiencies imposes no further burden on the courts
since, according to Ohio case law, the doctrines of preclusion require that a
party be accorded a full and fair opportunity to have his day in
court/arbitration. At the least, the courts should be more circumspect in
analyzing arbitration because the goals of arbitration do not correspond to
the goals of preclusion. Litigating a claim or issue completely may be
substantially more difficult when the proceeding itself urges efficiency and
compromise. Ohio courts should not accept, at face value, that just because
the former proceeding was arbitration, preclusion can easily apply.
Robert B. Murdoch

